

International Affairs BULLETIN

Smuts House Notes

Symposium

- **Changing Patterns in US — SA Relations**
W.B. Vosloo
- **The United States and South Africa: A Dialogue of the Deaf?**
Deon Geldenhuys
- **Foreign Pressures on South Africa: The Thumb-Screw as Conceptual Frame**
Newell M. Stultz

Lome II: The European Community and The North-South Dialogue
Klaus Baron von der Ropp

Book Reviews



**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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- 5 *American Political Science Review*, Vol 63, no 3, September 1969 pp 689-718
- 6 Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned Africanists (eds) *U.S. military involvement in Southern Africa* Boston, South End Press, 1978 p 25
- 7 Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster (eds), *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa* Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1978 p 25
- 8 Percy Cohen, "Social Attitudes and Sociological Enquiry", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol 12, 1966 pp 341-352
- 9 David Yudelman, "Industrialization race relations and change in South Africa" *African Affairs*, Vol 74, no 294 p 82
- 10 Amelia C. Leiss (ed) *Apartheid and the United Nations, Collective Measures an Analysis* New York Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 1965 pp 131-153
- 11 Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities the Citadel Assumption Revisited" *African Studies Review*, Vol 20, no 2, September 1977 p 98
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- 15 Arnt Spandau, *Economic Boycott Against South Africa* Keynwyn, Juta, 1979 p 142
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- 17 Arnt Spandau, *Economic Boycott Against South Africa*, p 144
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LOMÉ II : THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

Klaus Baron von der Ropp

Aspects of West European Development Policy

It took about a year of tough bargaining, marked by a number of crises, before the convention of Lomé (II) — named after the Togolese capital where it was originally signed — was finalised on 31 October 1979, and certain provisions of the Convention came into force on 1 March 1980. Lomé II, as the new Convention is usually called, marks an unbroken succession of treaties of a similar nature, i.e. the Conventions of Yaoundé I and II and Lomé I. Like Lomé II, the previous Conventions also had a validity of five years. The parties to Lomé II are the nine EEC nations and no less than forty-two countries of sub-Saharan Africa,* ten of the Caribbean and seven of the South-Western Pacific, collectively dubbed the ACP states.¹

There is still hope that, notwithstanding Soviet pressure, the Peoples Republics of Angola and Mozambique will join the Convention which embraces EC co-operation with the majority of the world's least developed countries in the fields of trade, finance, technology, industry and agriculture. Considering that the EC supported Portugal in its colonial wars out of which Mozambique and Angola emerged as independent states in the mid-70s, the very fact that they attended the Lomé II negotia-

It is understood that Zimbabwe will apply for membership of Lomé II

tions as observers should be regarded as a breakthrough. This success is further enhanced by the fact that both these states have had to depend largely on the help of the USSR, the German Democratic Republic (the GDR) and Cuba to preserve their precarious domestic stability.

Lomé II must be viewed in context with a number of existing or nascent co-operation agreements between the European Community and other Third World nations. Of particular interest in this connection are the treaties with the Mediterranean countries and the co-operation with the member nations of ASEAN. The latter link has been particularly promoted by Bonn Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and has been finalised by formal treaties.

Furthermore, Lomé II must be seen in conjunction with the benefits which the EC⁺ Commission in Brussels grants the developing countries. These benefits include the important general system of tariff preferences, food assistance, and special measures for emergencies plus a certain amount of financial and technical assistance for non-ACP countries.

However, the Lomé Treaties tower over all comparative treaties of this nature in terms of volume of aid, trade preferences granted and political relevance in general. As such, Lomé II should be seen as the nub of common West European development policy.

The main initiator of Lomé I and II, the able and energetic EC Commissioner Claude Cheysson, some time ago in an interview told the Abidjan (Ivory Coast) daily *Fraternité Matin* (12 June 1979) that co-operation after Lomé was a "*dialogue Nord-Sud en famille*". This might be an exaggeration, but, after the virtual total failure of UNCTAD V in Manila (May 1979) — from the perspective point of the developing countries — and the likely intensification of the international distribution struggle as a result, Lomé appears as a rare case of fruitful multilateral co-operation between the industrialised and the underdeveloped countries. After all, 45 per cent of the UNCTAD V participants are parties to the Lomé II Convention.

It is worth noting as a peripheral issue that periodic reports about institutionalised co-operation between Comecon and ACP countries such as Jamaica, Guyana, the Peoples Republic of Congo and Ethiopia (plus, of course, Angola and Mozambique) or indeed their impending membership of Comecon are probably without foundation. Comecon and its member states lack Third World experience with which the EC is richly endowed —

⁺ Whilst the Lomé Treaty is formally signed between the EEC and the ACP states, for the sake of convenience we shall regard all three European Communities as a single one; the European Community (EC)

primarily because of the membership of France and Britain in the EC — and its funds seem to be largely exhausted due to development assistance to Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam.² It can thus be assumed that in the 1980's any kind of co-operation with Comecon is no viable alternative — even for the so-called progressive ACP states — to co-operation with Western Europe within the framework of the Lomé Convention.

However, the experience with UNCTAD V ultimately indicates that the forthcoming gigantic distribution struggle will take place primarily between West and South rather than between East and South. The opening speech for the Lomé II negotiations in July 1978 by P.J. Patterson — then president of the ACP Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister of Jamaica — demonstrated the extent to which the Third World demand for a new international economic order dominates all West-South talks. According to Patterson EC-ACP negotiations were an important step for the ACP countries in the realisation of their ideas of a radical change of the existing international economic order. Bonn Foreign Minister Genscher, on the other hand, speaking as President of the EC Council of Ministers, restricted himself to referring to Lomé I as a model of co-operation among partners and saying that this would be consolidated in Lomé II.

It is therefore not surprising that the Lomé II talks were frequently marked by serious differences. In the ACP camp it was primarily the delegates of particularly Jamaica and Barbados and Nigeria who were prominent in this respect, and they were fairly successful in introducing the aggressive UNCTAD — type tone in the Brussels negotiations. This aggressiveness following the failures of UNCTAD IV and V, makes the conclusion of the Lomé II negotiations virtually on schedule even more remarkable and praiseworthy.

Dialogue Nord-Sud en famille or EEC-ACP Confrontation?

Naturally the Lomé II talks were only occasionally attended by the sixty-eight ministers concerned within the framework of the joint meetings of the EC and ACP Councils of Ministers. As a rule, the EC Commission, authorised by the EC Council of Ministers, negotiated with the President of the ACP Council of Ministers. They were assisted by members of the nine EEC Governments and the Ambassadors' Committee of the ACP nations.

It is well known that the ideas of the ACP countries on the re-shaping of their ties with Western Europe differed greatly. Most of the Francophone countries, for instance, were — and still are — quite conciliatory in their bargaining. A considerable number

of Anglophone countries, on the other hand, put forward tough demands in a manner that was often not diplomatic. The Nigerians frequently used a very sharp tone; but it should be borne in mind that, as with Lomé I, they stood to benefit relatively little, except in the field of industrial co-operation. It is also noteworthy that the general expressions of dissatisfaction by ACP states in 1978/79 were *much more vehement* than in the Lomé I negotiations five years earlier. Such divisions made it particularly important for the fifty-nine ACP countries to have an institution in Brussels that attempted to co-ordinate their diverging ideas. Considering that Lomé II is essentially a West European-African Convention, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) had sought to take the initiative in a number of instances: forty-two of the fifty-nine ACP countries (plus Angola and Mozambique) are OAU members. However, all attempts by the OAU to involve itself in the negotiations foundered on the fact that the OAU is a purely political organisation, and as such may be ill-equipped to deal with the international economic relations because it lacks the necessary expertise and specialised knowledge. The absence of the OAU, which attended the latest Lomé talks only in observer status lends importance for the co-ordination of the ideas for the fifty-nine developing countries to the Brussels-based ACP Secretariat headed by the very able Malian Tieoulé Konaté.

The most important elements of the new, and in many instances very complicated, Lomé Convention are briefly depicted and evaluated below. It should be noted at the outset that many differences of opinion remained until the signing of the Convention and have apparently meant that certain passages of Lomé II are less precise than those of Lomé I. In other words, differences of opinion that remained until the very end were apparently solved only through vague formulations in the text of the Convention, which leaves them open to interpretation.

(i) Trade

Expectedly provisions governing trade were the focal point of the Lomé II discussions and negotiations. The ACP countries continue to view unhampered access for *all* their products to the large industrial markets as a *prerequisite* for sustained growth and a smooth integration of their national economies into the world economy and there can be no escaping the fact that the trade privileges granted to the ACP countries in the EC market, whilst generous on paper, have been subject to *continuous* erosion. Although ACP exports to Western Europe doubled from 1970 to 1976, the proportion of EC imports from ACP countries

fell from 6.7 to 6.4 per cent. The fact that in the first quarter of 1979, the ACP countries for the first time achieved a surplus of 600 million accounting units* in their trade with the EC area should not give rise to too much optimism because this figure was primarily based on raw materials. The oil producers Nigeria and Gabon and the copper exporters Zaïre and Zambia have benefited, on the other hand the exports of the Cameroon, Ghana and Kenya fell.

In most exportable goods, the ACP countries are so uncompetitive that they have been unable to keep pace with the progressive and world-wide liberalisation of EC trade. Moreover, the enlargement of the EC with the addition of three relatively highly-developed developing countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) may hamper the competitiveness of the ACP nations. Furthermore, this southwards widening of the community may also shift limited development funds from the ACP region southwards in Europe itself.

As a matter of principle, Lomé I granted the products of ACP countries free access to Community markets, only a number of agricultural products, the so-called Agriculture Market Order goods, were exempted from the principle. These provisions have applied since February 1975, when Lomé I came into force, without reciprocity for EC exports to the ACP countries. In other words, a lopsided free trade zone operated in regard to this issue and Lomé II adheres to this system. It recognises the fact that the weaker parties to the treaty should enjoy special protection in their trade with industrialised countries. Pointing to the great importance of the export of single crop agricultural goods for some of the ACP nations, (for example: beef for Botswana), the ACP countries insisted that the EC abolish import duties and other levies for Agriculture Market Order goods exports as well. At the very least they maintain that these economies should be granted Most Favoured Nation status such as granted in other EC Preference Agreements. The Europeans have to a limited degree acceded to the wishes for further trade liberalisation. While the two above mentioned ACP demands were turned down, some existing duty-free ceilings in favour of the ACP countries were enlarged or redrafted to include additional products: this concerns import quotas for beef, tomatoes, carrots, onions and some other goods.

A paper of the EC Commission that was distributed before negotiations, promulgated the idea that the investment and, hence, trade policies of the ACP countries should be influenced by *compulsory* consultations within the framework of Lomé II.

One unit of account (ua) = \pm DM 2.63/ £0.60/\$US 1.40

This proposal, somewhat rashly dubbed as an attempt at government investment control, clearly bore the stamp of the French Socialist, Claude Cheysson. It was hoped that this would prevent the ACP countries from increasingly producing goods that are unsuitable for the vital EC market. The initiative was however turned down by both parties — naturally for very different reasons.

Notwithstanding ACP opposition, Lomé II also contains a protective clause in favour of the EC and its members. It follows essentially the clause in Lomé I which enables the EC to hamper the import to Western Europe of certain ACP products in case of serious possible disturbance for one of the sectors of the Community's economy. For instance: this could involve making it more difficult to export textiles to EC countries whose textile industries are struggling against unemployment, however this protective clause has never been used so far.

The industrial potential of the ACP countries is small and, as a result, their products are frequently not very competitive. After all, Tanzania is not a Singapore nor is Nigeria a South Korea, and there is no change in sight. What can change, however, is the economic situation in Western Europe, and this could make the electorate call for protectionist measures against everybody.

One of the new features in Lomé II is that any invocation of the protective clause must be preceded by consultations with the ACP country concerned. In fact, the ACP nations even went so far as to demand a contractually binding co-determination on this which was naturally unsuccessful.

(ii) **Stabilisation of Export Earnings**

Much has been written — and rightly so — about the disastrous consequences of fluctuating commodity prices for the economies of developing countries. To propound only a market economy thesis in this connection would, in the case of many ACP countries, be tantamount to degrading them to the role of recipients of aid that would have the character of permanent subsidies. With this in mind, Lomé I in a major innovation, introduced a system for the Stabilisation of Export Earnings (STABEX) for a number of important agricultural products and iron ore. The system provides limited protection against export shortfalls caused by unfavourable economic conditions, *i.e.* diminished demand in the EC or by reduced production due to natural disasters, and becomes operational only when a number of conditions have been met; above all, that the export of a specific commodity be of considerable importance for the economy of the ACP country concerned. Depending on the

degree of development in the recipient country, STABEX payments are made either in the form of a non-repayable grant or as a loan on extremely favourable terms.

Under Lomé I — and this shows one of its limitations — the STABEX system had a fund totalling 382 million units of account. The importance which the ACP countries attributed to the STABEX system is also demonstrated by their demand that *all* their export goods be put on the STABEX list in Lomé II. If nothing else, the enormous cost to the EEC should have made it obvious from the very beginning that such a demand could not be met.

Despite these hurdles, the European Community made a number of remarkable concessions on STABEX in Lomé II. Thus, for instance, the list now includes forty-four agricultural products. Moreover, the terms under which a country can claim STABEX funds have been improved and the so-called triggering threshold lowered. In addition, the fund has been raised to 500 million units of account for the duration of Lomé II.

Under the STABEX system the only mineral covered was iron ore and there is a likelihood that iron ore will also be struck from the list under Lomé II. The EEC intends to pursue a different course regarding minerals and it has managed to persist with this intention at talks with the ACP group. The new system does not involve measures to stabilise export earnings — notwithstanding the fact that it is occasionally misleadingly referred to as a STABEX system for minerals. Instead, the EEC provides credits to the tune of 280 million accounting units. These credits are structured as a blend of an investment policy, EEC raw materials interests and bridging facilities in case of shortfalls in earning. The system can thus be termed as a minerals crisis fund.

(iii) The EEC-ACP Minerals Crisis Fund

Like STABEX, the new system also applies only to products whose export is of particular importance to individual ACP countries. Under the existing agreement, these include copper and cobalt (Zambia, Zaire and Papua-New Guinea), phosphates (Senegal and Togo), bauxite and aluminium (Guyana, Guinea-Conakry, Surinam and Jamaica), manganese (Gabon), tin (Ruanda) and, under special provisions, iron ore (Liberia and, later, Mauretania).

The minerals support mechanism is triggered when — due to natural disasters, technical breakdowns or political unrest — massive earnings or production shortfalls (10 per cent) occur and when the export dependence threshold in the preceding four years has averaged 15 per cent or 10 per cent for the least

developed countries, such loans carry an interest rate of 1 per cent and are repayable within thirty years after a ten-year period of grace.

The system has come under considerable attack by Zambia, Zaire, Papua-New Guinea and Mauretania. They argue that the Community's sole objective is to preserve those production capacities in times of crisis that serve its own economies with minerals. What they wanted instead, was a stabilisation of their export earnings in the interest of sustained development. The exclusion from the list of a number of minerals (among them chrome, graphite and perhaps uranium) has also come under fire. The ACP group even went so far as to consider voicing this criticism in an official unilateral declaration on Lomé II.

(iv) EEC-ACP Financial Co-operation

Even a newspaper like *Le Monde*, which strongly sympathises with the ideas and interests of the Third World, reported relatively little on the course and results of the Lomé II talks, although the sharp dispute over the volume of the new European Development Fund (EDF) was widely publicised. The dispute led in May 1979 to an indefinite adjournment — at a time when, according to the French, which then presided over the talks, the Convention should have been closed. The ideas of the two sides appeared simply too far apart to be bridged. On the one hand the ACP group demanded that the EDF should be tripled for Lomé II: an increase from 3.17 billion to 10.5 billion accounting units. Their main argument was that of general inflation, the excessive price increases for industrial goods which they customarily buy in Western Europe and the increased number of ACP countries to fifty-nine (and soon possibly sixty-two).

The Community, on the other hand, argued that these factors had been taken into account by raising the Fund for Lomé II to 5.1 billion units of account. Justifiably, the EC pointed to the large bilateral development contributions made by its members and the Community's own (and still to be increased) development aid outside the European Development Fund — primarily payments under the Sugar Protocol, imports of beef and food assistance etc.

These arguments and the widespread concern among ACP countries that a further delay in signing Lomé II would lead to a vacuum once Lomé I expired finally led to a compromise. The outcome was very close to the original ideas of the EC and was thus far removed from those of the ACP group. It was agreed that the EC provide 3.712 billion units of account between 1980 and 1985 and that the European Investment Bank provide an

additional 685 million units of account. Added to this are 180 million units of account from the EC budget for the maintenance of the so-called "Euroembassies" in ACP countries plus, from the European Development Fund, 550 million and 280 million units of account for the financing of STABEX and the minerals crisis fund respectively.

Moreover — and this is another innovation — the European Investment Bank (EIB) is to provide another 200 million units of account for technical assistance in the development and exploitation of ore deposits.

The above initiatives should be viewed in conjunction with the stagnation and the subsequent decline of West European investments in the ACP region over the past few years. Mining was particularly badly hit by these declining developments. These were due not only to siting disadvantages but in many instances also to legal uncertainty, *i.e.* inadequate or nonexistent investment safeguards. It thus remains to be seen whether the EEC will succeed in realising its intention to conclude special investment protection agreements with the ACP countries concerned in order to promote these mining industry projects.

(v) Special Co-operation In the Sectors of Industry and Agriculture

Apart from the Brussels Centre for Industrial Development which has been in existence for some years, a new centre for Agro-technical Co-operation is now to be established, though this will be rather poorly funded. Both institutions are meant to act as mediator between interested business circles in the EEC and ACP regions. It remains to be seen, however, whether the new institution will succeed in making even a moderate contribution towards relieving the frequently extreme agricultural malaise in many ACP countries.

Anyone comparing the agricultures of most African states during the colonial era with conditions in 1980 will frequently find that there has been a continuous decline. Apart from South Africa and Zimbabwe, only Kenya can feed itself from its domestic production. Yet there used to be a considerable number of states that could do so during colonial rule. Many black African governments have either no agricultural policy at all or at best an extremely poor one: Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda and Nigeria are telling examples of this phenomenon.

(vi) Investment Safeguards

The important problem of investment safeguards, under Lomé II, was unable to be solved satisfactorily. The original intention was to include a relevant clause in the text of Lomé I, but

this would have lagged behind the five major provisions of a classical investment protection clause. The introduction of such a passage in Lomé I was opposed by some of the so-called progressive ACP countries, as they argued that this was inconsistent with their national sovereignty. As a result of this uncertainty Europeans now have little interest in investing in many of the ACP states and only occasionally can this situation be alleviated by bilateral agreements. The political weight behind an extensive investment protection clause as part of an encompassing multilateral treaty would of course be incomparably greater than that of mere bilateral agreements. But the Lomé II negotiations showed that countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Benin or Madagascar are simply not prepared to include such clauses in Lomé - type conventions because they considered them politically intolerable.

It should not go unmentioned that the West European countries were themselves unable to reach agreement on whether Lomé II should contain at least a modified and less stringent investment protection clause. For the three EEC countries (West Germany, Britain and France) that have satisfactory bilateral agreements on investment safeguards with a considerable number of ACP countries, this would naturally have meant a worsening of their legal positions for their own network of investment guarantees would have been prejudiced.

The majority of the ACP countries realised that Lomé II should have offered more safeguards for West European business interests in order to mobilise additional private sector funds for their own development. A Belgian initiative that took primarily the interests of the smaller EEC countries into account seemed to point a way out of the dilemma. This was the development of a type of "most favoured nation" clause, contractually granted by an ACP country to an EEC member, wherein investment protection would be extended to all other EEC nations. Judging by the little that has become known about this plan, it did not generate a breakthrough, but it brought some improvement in the legal position of Lomé I where this issue was incorporated in the insubstantial Article 38.

Perhaps a possible Lomé III (1985 to 1990) will contain a clause that will go further and will largely correspond to a classical investment protection clause. If not, West European business might well continue to favour countries outside black Africa for investment.

(vii) The Handling of Some Political Issues

The question whether Lomé II should contain a Human

Rights clause was a bone of contention at the Brussels negotiations from the first day. It was primarily the events during the eight-year terror regime of Idi Amin in Uganda, one of the ACP states, that prompted this issue. Yielding to pressure from London, the EC Council of Ministers in its declaration of 21 June 1976, deplored the conditions in that country and resolved that aid granted to Uganda under Lomé I be structured in such a manner as to prevent the Kampala Government from using it for the suppression of its own people.

Although such a step seemed politically justifiable, it was in terms of international law somewhat questionable. Since Lomé I contains no clause to the effect that development aid must ultimately and in the broadest sense serve to realise Human Rights, the 1976 declaration of the EC Council of Ministers unilaterally interfered with Lomé I and as a result, probably violated international law. The insertion in Lomé II of a limited Human Rights clause was intended to clarify the future legal position. It is worth noting in this connection that the Brussels authorities certainly had detailed information on the terror regimes of Macias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea) and Jean-Bedel Bokassa (Central African Empire) even before the two dictators were toppled, and that the same applies to similar regimes in the ACP region.

It is understandable that the EEC pressed to make the granting of future development aid contingent on the observance of a few fundamental human rights. However the ACP group vehemently opposed this and its objections gained the upper hand in the end. Its main line of rebuttal was the supposedly purely economic nature of Lomé II and the dubious contention that such a clause would amount to interference by the EEC in the domestic affairs of other countries.

The parliament-like EC-ACP bodies, *i.e.* the Consultative Assembly and its Representative Committee, will as in the past, devote attention to the problems of Southern Africa (especially South Africa) and the policy of EC countries towards that region, and this could provide an opportunity to develop a constructive South Africa policy. Naturally, this would have to amount to more than a vehement and unconditional condemnation of South Africa's internal system of institutionalised racism, justified though this may be. Instead, it should also — and with the same vehemence — demand that the apartheid regime be replaced by a new order for South Africa — an order that would also provide a future for the white and the brown Africans who have been part of the country for more than three centuries. This

would have to include permanent copper-bottomed guarantees securing the white and the brown Africans' right to existence.

Such an approach is frequently overlooked for reasons of political opportunism or ideological conviction. A March 1979 "Report of the Committee on Development and Co-operation" of the European Parliament was particularly gratifying because it was recognised that a solution to South Africa's problems lay in either "a federation *sui generis*" or in "genuine partition". It is however extremely disconcerting that this report was redrafted a short while later and was denuded of many of its constructive elements.

Adoption by the EC and the EC-ACP authorities of the often one-sided theses of the OAU and the United Nations cannot solve the problems of the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps hope will only dawn once the conflicts in and over the Republic of South Africa have become even more acute. It is at that point that, within the framework of Western Europe, the Governments of Britain and France, which are simply more competent in such matters, will have to seek an equitable compromise to solve this explosive conflict.

All politically relevant groups and parties of Western Europe are certainly agreed that the compromise to be realised can only be drafted by a National Convention of all important groups of black, white and brown South Africans. Only thus will it be possible to prevent South Africa from eventually being engulfed by an inferno — and impose an intolerable burden on ACP-EEC co-operation.

Seen in this light, Lomé II might not only bring many economic advantages to Africans and Europeans as well as to the Caribbean and Pacific peoples, but could also be a contributing factor in bringing one of the most dangerous regional conflicts closer to a peaceful solution.

NOTES

1. *Parties to the Convention:*

ACP Countries

Original 46

Africa

Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon

Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya

Lesotho
 Liberia
 Madagascar
 Malawi
 Mali
 Mauritania
 Mauritius
 Niger
 Nigeria
 Rwanda
 Senegal
 Sierra Leone
 Somalia
 Sudan
 Swaziland
 Tanzania
 Togo
 Uganda
 Upper Volta
 Zaire
 Zambia

Caribbean

Bahamas
 Barbados
 Grenada
 Guyana
 Jamaica
 Trinidad and Tobago

Pacific

Fiji
 Tonga
 Western Samoa

Additional 13

Cape Verde
 Comoros
 Dominica
 Djibouti
 Kiribati
 Papua New Guinea
 Sao Tome/Principe
 Seychelles
 St. Lucia
 St. Vincent
 Solomon Islands
 Surinam
 Tuvalu

EEC 9

Belgium
 Denmark
 France
 Fed. Rep. of Germany
 Ireland
 Italy
 Luxembourg
 Netherlands
 United Kingdom

France:

Overseas Departments

Guadeloupe
 Guiana
 Martinique
 Reunion
 St. Pierre et Miquelon

Territories

New Hebrides (Anglo-French Condominium)
 Mayotte
 New Caledonia and Dependencies
 French Polynesia
 French Southern and Antarctic Territories
 Wallis and Futuna Islands

Netherlands:

Overseas Countries

Netherlands Antilles
 Aruba
 Bonaire
 Curacao
 Saba
 St. Eustatius
 St. Martin

Britain:

Overseas Countries and Territories

New Hebrides (Anglo-French Condominium)
 Antigua
 Belize
 British Antarctic Territory
 British Indian Ocean Territory
 British Virgin Islands
 Brunei
 Cayman Islands
 Falkland Islands
 Montserrat
 Nevis and Anguilla
 Pitcairn Island
 St. Helena and Dependencies
 St. Kitts
 Turks and Caicos Island

- 2 Important pioneering work in the East's alliance with the "South" is to be found in Siegfried Kupper, "Alte Programme für schwierige Aufgaben / Zur 33. Tagung des RGW" in *Deutschland Archiv* Cologne 1979, no. 8 pp. 794-797 and Jürgen Notzold "Die RGW-Staaten und der Nord-Süd-Dialog" in *Außenpolitik* 2/79, pp. 192-209.
- 3 For a discussion on such guarantees see Jürgen Blenck and Klaus Baron von der Ropp, "Republic of South Africa: Is Partition a Solution?" in *South African Journal of African Affairs*, Pretoria vol. 7, no. 1, 1977 pp. 21-32 and Klaus Baron von der Ropp, "Is Territorial Partition a Strategy for Peaceful change in South Africa?" in *International Affairs Bulletin*, Johannesburg vol. 3, no. 1, June 1979 pp. 36-47.