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South Africa's Challenge to the Western World: A German View

Klaus Baron von der Ropp

At a conference in Maseru/Lesotho in early 1983 that discussed possibilities and means of an increased cooperation between the European Community and the South African Development Coordination Conference, the Community's Commissioner for Development, Edgard Pisani, reportedly said "This game of building up and blowing up must be stopped!"

How can this be achieved, as long as white and black South Africans do not discuss the future of the country with each other? Is there not an obligation of the Western governments to use jointly the existing political, diplomatic and economic instruments in order to support all efforts towards genuine and peaceful change in Southern Africa with the aim to counteract policies of violence? Is it not strange that Western governments find it so difficult not only to get this message but to act accordingly? Up to 1976 the year of the Soweto uprising, the Western Countries more or less supported Pretoria's domestic policy and afterwards most of them thought that it was sufficient to glibly offer easy solutions to SWA's/Namibia's and particularly South Africa's problems. The seriousness of the situation and the necessity for the West to act became crystal-clear, when it became apparent that many black South Africans inside and outside of the Republic's borders applauded loudly whenever they hear of armed ANC-attacks against strategically important installations like the coal-gasification plants Sasol I and II, the military complex in Voortrekkerhoogte and the Koeberg nuclear power-stations.

Moderate black leaders increasingly seem to lose the support they could command to militant leaders who manage to show the black masses that they not the moderates know how to show Pretoria the limits of its power. But it must be questioned whether militant black South African groups are aware of the white South Africans', especially Afrikanerdom's iron determination to stay on and fight it out. Like many officials in Western countries, these black South Africans apparently do not realize that whoever wants to bring freedom to black South Africans will have to show white South Africans a perspective for their own future in South Africa as well. Many observers in the West today will share the impression, expressed by former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who in autumn 1982 in Johannesburg remarked that the conflict in and over South Africa in the 90s threatens to become as dangerous as today's Middle East conflict. In the West today there is a widespread fear that in the years to come, an armed conflict will develop that will include all the elements of the Middle East and the Ulster conflicts. Years ago, Egon Bahr, a leading German social democrat

predicted that, if it came to the worst in the Republic, the South Africa conflict might turn into a new global war¹.

Especially Germans, who remember the years 1939—45 and the sufferings of those and the following years only too well, put the question whether the scenario described by Denis Beckett in late 1981 in his magazine "Front-line" was inevitable². Particularly the scenario on the frontpage struck Germans, and of course South Africans as well, as gruesome: amid the war-ravaged rubble heap that was once the flowering metropolis Johannesburg stands the burnt-out ruin of the Carlton, the city's largest and most expensive hotel complex.

Many visitors to the Republic will agree that there is a nearly total polarisation between black and white Africans. In South Africa the First and the Fourth World meet, and quite obviously they have very little in common. Even a dialogue between liberal whites and moderate blacks, the latter by the way in all probability being a decreasing minority, seems to be immensely difficult. Left on their own, one fears Beckett's prediction for South Africans might come true: "The reality is that there is going to be no successful revolution, now or in the future. Eventually, without doubt, a black government would come to power, but this in itself would hardly be 'successful' if the cost was the total devastation of the nation, which is what the cost would be."² If one looks for any country that can take over the role of mediator so important in a deeply divided country then only the main Western countries come to mind. They should do everything they can to help South Africans to find solutions to their uniquely difficult problems. In view of the risks, it should be taken for granted, that the Western powers, if only to preserve their own interests, will go out of their way to settle the latent armed conflict in and around South Africa.

For the government of the Federal Republic of Germany there is a special motive to act: in the whole of Germany, both East and West, there are to be found very strong actual and historical sympathies for the Afrikaners. They date back to the days of the "Boer war" and even earlier. The interests and sympathies, the Afrikaners, show towards the Germans are fully replied by the Germans, however restrained the political relations between the Federal Republic and the Republic of South Africa in the last years may have been and, despite the change of the Bonn government in late 1982, still are. As long as apartheid reigns in South Africa, there will be no breakthrough in the political relations between the two countries.

No West German government would feel inclined to leave the Afrikaners in the lurch, whatever its official policy may be, because of underlying sympathies. Maybe these mutual sympathies could be used to establish a dialogue between Bonn and Pretoria which would be helpful in promoting the intra-South African dialogue, in a divided country. It was by no means a coincidence, that it was a German politician, namely Volkmar Köhler, a leading member of the new West German administration, who in September 1982 stated at a conference in Johannesburg more outspokenly than any of the other foreign participants: "... those who want freedom and self-determination for the Blacks in South Africa must not only take into account the determination as well as the military and economic strength of the White South Africans, whether English- or Afrikaans-speaking. They must also concede to this White African nation the only thing it does not possess: namely security for its children and grandchildren. Freedom for Black South Africa presupposes the finding of a way to protect, in terms of power politics, the right of existence for the White African nation as well as for the Coloureds and Indians there. Those people who do not realize this ... are hardly achieving anything more than simply presenting to South Africa an abyss of awful violence."³

There was much hope that the main Western powers would successfully play the role of mediators when in March 1977 the then Western members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, West Germany and Canada) started their initiative to lead SWA/Namibia into an internationally recognized independence, but its main architects (Washington and Bonn) apparently had not realized how fundamental the differences between the conflict in SWA/Namibia and South Africa really are. So in all probability the SWA/Namibia initiative was already stillborn in 1977. If not, it was clinically dead by about October 1978.

For in October 1978 Pretoria cast to the winds all the Five's warnings and officious threats of economic sanctions and other coercive measures, ignored the Western plan for SWA's/Namibia's independence laid down in Res. 435 of the UN Security Council and went ahead with its own "internal" solution: The December 1978 elections, in which SWAPO, by far Namibia's strongest political party, of course did not participate. The West launched verbal protests, but they were not followed by gestures, not to mention deeds. That was the very moment when Pretoria realized it could have a relatively easy play with the Western powers which had previously

seemed so self-assured, demanding and even arrogant, but then proved to be toothless lions. And black South Africa by then realized that the West was not prepared to make any sacrifices for black South Africans. The policy of the Western countries from then on continued to be a policy of more or less empty speeches.

Since 1978, apart from the SWA/Namibia initiative, all plans for similar initiative to solve the SA conflict might as well have been kept in the drawers. The latter initiative by the way had been far more discussed in Washington, Bonn and Ottawa than by the French and the British, who know Africa far better than their allies do.

Yet, however disappointing the results of the Western Southern African policies of those years are, in view of the dangers existing in the Southern third of the African continent there is no other option but to continue the diplomatic efforts in order to bring peace to Southern Africa. A return to the benevolent indifference towards the region's political problems, as it existed in the West up to 1974 or 1976, would be absolutely fatal.

The most important lesson to be drawn from the past seems to be that the Americans, the West Germans and the Canadians (not the French and the British!) made a blunder when they did not realize that, other than in SWA/Namibia and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the whites living in South Africa are not a settlers' community, but a nation of its own, which, admittedly in the midst of a huge black majority, has developed over more than the last three centuries in the most Southern part of Africa. It should go without saying, that even its most liberal representatives — be they Afrikaans- or English-speaking — are ready to negotiate everything with black South Africa but the right of existence of their own white nation. Volkmar Köhler, in the above mentioned speech, showed more of an understanding for South Africa's dilemma policies in the late 1970s. Strangely enough the right of existence for white South Africans is overlooked by many Western critics of South Africa. They do not see that when this right as an African nation is threatened the attitude of the liberal PFP under the leadership of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert will be as uncompromising, as tough, and as unrelenting as that of the reactionary Herstigte Nasionale Party under the leadership of Jaap Marais. To more or less all white South Africans what has been said above may look like a collection of trifles, for Western policy-makers it does not! Otherwise there would not have been so many demands

by American, West German and Canadian officials, often voiced in an arrogant tone, to introduce the one-man-one-vote-system to South Africa.

Probably no other single item contributed as much to the failure of the West as the American, the West German and the Canadian view put forward even in the UN Security Council, that the solution found for Namibia (that is the unqualified one-man-one-vote-system) would serve as a model for South Africa.

Have those Western negotiators not read their history books and learned from them not only black South Africa's total opposition to the evil order of apartheid but also white South Africa's iron determination to fight bloody wars to defend its interests? Did those politicians in Washington, New York, Bonn and Ottawa not remember that former US Secretary of Foreign Affairs Henry Kissinger, after his first meeting with Balthazar Johannes Vorster in mid-1976 in Southern Germany, had remarked, that he had met a figure out of the Old Testament, meaning that the justification for the position one defends is a holy one, not amenable to human reasoning? And did those Westerners not take seriously the warnings, the President of INKATHA, Gatsha Buthelezi, gave again and again in South Africa and abroad: "Better than most I know the reality of white power, better than most I know the whites' readiness to scorch the earth in the eleventh hour and to die in defense of the indefensible?"⁴

Whether or not the UN and/or the OAU are able to accept such a point, there is no doubt that any constructive Western South Africa policy will have to start from the assumption that as long as Pretoria still governs with ease in both SWA/Namibia and South Africa the key to political change must be safeguards for the white (and brown) minorities in SWA/Namibia and copper-bottomed guarantees for the continued existence of the white African nation (and the two brown minorities) in South Africa. Any policy that does not realise this is unhistoric and doomed to failure.

There were certain hopes for a positive change when the highly qualified Republican Chester Crocker took over from his Democratic predecessor as President Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary of African Affairs. Up to now all such hopes were totally disappointed. There seem to be two reasons: in the years 1977 to 1980 a situation had developed where all mutual trust and/or confidence between South Africa on the one hand and the

Western Five on the other was completely destroyed. And Chester Crocker did neither have the time nor all the necessary allies in Canada and Europe to reestablish a minimum of trust, without which constructive engagement could not work. Secondly, and this seems to be more important, the South African government which apparently discussed the internal situation of the Republic with its American counterparts, lacked the courage and the electorate's support for fundamental change. Chester Crocker would have needed a partner with the visions of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, a partner P.W. Botha will never be. Slabbert could act as a mediator, a role Botha would never assume. The West will have to wait for long, before the damage created in the days of the Carter administration will have been undone. The damage was done by lack of understanding of the South African situation as a whole, the use of slogans that won appraisal in black Africa but was combined with a leniency in dealing with conflicts that only helped to confuse all South Africans.

White South Africa maybe will have to suffer a lot more before it will realize that even if today it acts as the regional super-power, the future will show it the limits of its power. 3.6 million Israelis do control their country. But only 5 million white Africans control a country which has about 30 times (and including Namibia even 50 times) the size of Israel? The borders are too long to be controllable for those few people; the Fifth column in South Africa is too numerous to be tackled by 5 million people only. And finally New York backs Israel, it does not back white South Africa and it will not do so in the future.

As Volkmar Köhler said in his speech, instead of trying to impose a Western-made constitutional model, the West must do everything possible to encourage the conflicting parties in the Republic of South Africa to sit down at the conference-table to debate economic, social and political aspects of a new order for South Africa. Similarly, in the quoted interview Egon Bahr argued that as neither "one-man-one-vote" nor a (radical) geographic partition of the country could provide the answer to South Africa's problems "a hitherto unknown model of coexistence with equal rights and special protection for minorities" has to be evolved in South Africa. Is this not exactly what leading Afrikaner journalists had in mind when after Robert G. Mugabe's overwhelming victory in the February 1980 elections they demanded in their papers (*Beeld*, *Rapport*, *Die Transvaler* and *Die Vaderland*) that their government in Pretoria would have to discuss the future of

the country with the "genuine leaders" of black and brown South Africa?⁵ No doubt, these Afrikaners also had leaders in mind who are still detained or must live in exile. Ton Vosloo of Beeld wrote explicitly that the ANC was the strongest movement and thus had to be a partner in this dialogue. There are quite a number of influential Afrikaners who talk openly about having lost their almost religious belief in the rightness of the path followed for the past 35 years. Some of them even call for the crucifixion of such once-admired Afrikaner leaders as Hendrik Verwoerd and B.J. Vorster. In the West it should be taken most seriously that in an article in the Sunday paper Rapport (February 14th, 1982) Willem de Klerk, one of the country's most influential publicists, cited an important NP member of Parliament as having said that, unless there was fundamental change, HNP and ANC would negotiate the capitulation of white South Africa by the end of the decade. These courageous comments at least in public did not in the Western Press and by Western governments win the attention they deserve. What else do Westerners expect from Afrikaners who are members of the governing Nasionale Party van Suid-Afrika? Were these articles not an excellent opportunity to be grasped by Western governments? And what support did the President of INKATHA receive from Western sources when the findings of the Buthelezi Commission were published early 1982, which advocated a consociational order for Natal? Having in mind Gatsha Buthelezi's position in black South Africa and that of Ton Vosloo and Willem de Klerk in Afrikanerdom it should have been an absolute must for the West to use these South African initiatives to start their own diplomatic initiatives, to promote an intra-South African dialogue on the future of the Republic.

South Africa is for the West too important a country to let Western governments wait with constructive peace-initiatives until the day, when the sufferings among white and black South Africans are such, that, to avoid further sufferings, the South African parties to the conflict become prepared to discuss compromises.

To look for compromises means first of all to look for fallback positions. What might those constitutional fall-back positions look like? A good deal of research has been done on this subject in recent years, surprisingly not by British and French but by German⁶, Dutch and American and of course South African scholars. The centre of the debate was in most cases the home of an Afrikaner namely that of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert.

All the involved South Africa observers had been busy with the Republic for many years. So they knew only too well that the mass of white voters and the vast majority of black people did not show much of an interest in any discussions on fall-back positions. But on the other hand there were groups of both, white and black Africans, who looked for new ways of settling their conflicts. The small community of South Africa observers knew how deeply divided the South African society is, far more divided than most outsiders seem to realize: take for instance the most liberal English-language daily, the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail (RDM). Its editor-in-chief, Alistair Sparks, saw his paper as “a unique bridge between the racial ghettos”⁷. But then under his leadership, for commercial reasons (!), it was decided to produce separate issues for its white and black readership. Occasionally, the two editions of the RDM have entirely different contents. This happened for instance at the beginning of April 1979 with the hanging of Solomon Mahlangu, a member of the ANC, who had been sentenced to death, under a constitutionally faultless procedure, for committing two politically-motivated murders. The hanged man was simply a common criminal as far as whites were concerned, but for the blacks, he was a symbol of freedom. The same impression was created one year later on the occasion of the burial of the three men shot by police after the raid on the bank in Silverton. And a look at the 13th March 1982 black and white editions of the RDM shows how small the common black-white denominator has become in South Africa. It also shows the vastness of the chasm that separates black and white. The black edition of the paper shows on its front page a large photograph of black mothers on hunger strike at Cape Town’s St. George’s Cathedral. What they wanted to achieve with their fast was to be permitted to live with their husbands working on the periphery of Cape Town rather than be treated as illegal squatters and be deported to one of the “independent” Bantustans, in this case Ciskei or Transkei. On the same day, the white edition of the RDM showed in the front page place a photograph of a (now rare) UK — South Africa cricket match.

Symptomatic too is the proposal discussed early in 1980 by black (and brown) South African Christians (Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, i.e. all from integrated churches) to found their own “Confessing Church”, a church of protest and liberation.

The works of the scholars mentioned above are to a large degree based on the findings of the German-South African-Dutch study of the Arnold

Bergstraesser Institute (Freiburg) on the whites' preparedness for change and the blacks' expectations in change in the social, economic and political fields⁸. In this context two basic concepts of a new political order are being discussed in South Africa and abroad: consociationalism and radical (geographical) partition.

Forms of consociational rule have already proved their value, not only in some Western countries, but also in Lebanon. But do the prerequisites for such a constitutional order exist in South Africa⁹? Even many of the advocates of consociationalism have grave doubts. There is for instance no common enemy. Moreover, as explained before, what the blacks call the fight for freedom is seen by the whites as politically-motivated terrorism. For centuries the political climate in the Republic has been one of separation of segregation. The ethnic groups differ considerably in numerical strength. Clearly the foreign and South African consociationalists must ask themselves whether the people of South Africa really have a social, economic, cultural and political common denominator, for without it, even a consociational democracy will not work. A very informative answer to this problem was given by Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh, who said: "The only hope that some narrow basis for consensus could be established and consolidated is if the antagonists have a glimpse into the abyss of violence, economic disaster and all the miseries that go with unrestrained conflict¹⁰". So everything will have to be tried, to adapt the theoretical frame of consociationalism to South African realities.

But what is to be done, if all these attempts fail? With Chester A. Crocker and a number of other Africanists at that moment the question will have to be asked, whether a negotiated partition might not be the appropriate answer to South Africa's political problems¹¹. It should not be forgotten that it was a highly respected liberal white African, R.F. Alfred Hoernlé, who nearly fifty years ago first asked this question¹². Here and there, good hedges do make good neighbours. In South Africa in 1983 even certain liberals are coming to the conclusion that the vitally necessary copper-bottomed guarantees of existence for the minorities will only be brought into being with the hammering into the ground of border-makers.

Linking up with Hoernlé's contribution, and in the light of the fact that radical partitioning of South Africa will very likely be the (only) common fall-back position of the white South African parties¹³, very detailed proposals

were put forward for discussion in 1976 in the German periodical *Außenpolitik*, and a year later in the *South African Journal of African Affairs*¹⁴. In the following years these proposals, that include very detailed maps, were discussed by quite a number of scholars and politicians¹⁵. For reasons of space details of this debate cannot be reported here. But let us state that C.L. Sulzberger had a very good point when he wrote in the *New York Times* and the *International Tribune* of 10th August, 1977 that these proposals could only be the alternative to a holocaust.

If such a radical geographical partition really should one day be the answer to South Africa's dilemma, then basically there are two ways how such a solution could actually be implemented. One was described by Van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh who commented the *Außenpolitik*-proposals and said: "It is conceivable that partition may be a last-resort option in a no-win situation but quite likely the line will be drawn where the battle has ended and not where it has been thought out in morally and intellectually defensible terms in some scholar's study"¹⁶. Their views seem to be shared by many other South Africa specialists who commented the *Außenpolitik*-proposals, among them the South African P.L. Moorcraft, the Frenchman Pierre Mayer, the German Heribert Adam and the Dutchman Arend Lijphart¹⁷. A.J. Venter, and maybe Newell M. Stultz as well argue: "In the final analysis it may also be impossible for South Africa to maintain unity among diversity of a sustained consociational marriage and some kind of divorce (such as India and Pakistan in 1948) may well be a viable alternative — despite the enormous costs involved"¹⁸.

When India and Pakistan were partitioned and each country gained independence there was an imperial power granting independence, Britain. She also tried to supervise the partition process and to prevent bloodshed, not to much avail.

South Africa is an independent country, its problems are internal ones and the proposition made by Rudolf Gruber of the South Africa Foundation, who is opposed to partition, that the West could play the role of the "imperial factor" during the process of solving the South African problem, will in all probability not be taken up.

It is doubtful whether the West, or for that matter Western liberal parties, will revise the attitude of resignation, they have proved to have in the re-

cent past, in the future. Is it unfair to say that this attitude implies a betrayal of those forces in South Africa who fight the system, particularly our friends in the PFP? Is it not true that by assuming an attitude of resignation one contributes to the dangers Egon Bahr and Robert McNamara warned of so eloquently?

In view of what has been outlined above in my opinion Western liberal parties have but one option that is to intensify their contacts with the PFP in order to make us familiar with the extremely complex problems of South Africa, to increase our knowledge about South Africa. And we should not only intensify our contacts with the PFP but initiate contacts with all other relevant political groups inside and outside of the Republic, among them the ANC, INKATHA and last not least the governing Nasionale Party.

Our main objective in developing such contacts should be to keep us informed about developments and by this enable us to help in formulating and realizing a policy of mediation. It would also be helpful if the Arnold Bergstaesser Institute could from time to time repeat its invaluable study of the 1970s. For such studies would provide us with additional facts on chances and directions of peaceful and violent changes in South Africa.

Let us be aware of the chances we have to contribute to a solution in South Africa and let us liberals first and foremost intensify our contacts with our natural partner, the PFP.

¹ The interview with Egon Bahr was published by Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt (Hamburg), 10 July 1977, p. 8.

² "The future/Can it come to this?", Frontline (Johannesburg) Nov/Dec 1981, p. 38—39.

³ "Europe's role in Africa: A German view" in International Affairs Bulletin (Braamfontein) 3/1982, p. 35—45 (39—41).

⁴ "Christian Perspectives of the Black Liberation Struggle in South Africa" in South African Outlook (Rondebosch) 9/1979, p. 137.

⁵ Cf. Beeld (Johannesburg), 4 March 1980 ("Kies nou"); L. Oosthuizen "Witmense weet nog nie hoe swart en bruin dink en voel", Rapport (Johannesburg), 30 March 1980, p. 20; Ton Vosloo "Soos Swapo, lê die ANC voor" Beeld, 9 Jan 1981.

⁶ The German debate will be described and analysed in a study to be published 1984 in Johannesburg by Deon Geldenhuys of RAU. It will be entitled "West German Perceptions of South Africa's Political Alternatives". Cf. furthermore Wolfgang H. Thomas (University of the Western Cape/Bellville) "Südafrika zwischen Teilung und Integration", Außenpolitik (Hamburg), 3/1979, p. 301—322.

- ⁷ Quoted by John Kane-Berman "Requiem for a Newspaper", *Sash*, Aug 1981, p. 5.
- ⁸ Theodor Hanf et alia "Südafrika: Friedlicher Wandel?", Munich and Mainz, 1978. The English-language version of this study is entitled "South Africa: the prospects of peaceful change", London, Cape Town, Bloomington, 1981.
- ⁹ Cf. on this subject Arend Lijphart (in lieu of all others) "Majority Rule versus Democracy in deeply divided societies", *Politikon* (Pretoria), 2/1977, p. 113—126.
- ¹⁰ "South Africa's Options/ Strategies for Sharing Power", Cape Town, 1979, p. 119.
- ¹¹ "South Africa: Strategy for Change", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), winter 1980/81, p. 323—351 (348).
- ¹² "Anatomy of Segregation", *Race Relations* (Johannesburg), Febr 1936, p. 14—21.
- ¹³ See Hoernlé's paper and two articles written by authors who are at least close to A. Treurnicht's KP "Voorgestelde gebiede vir blanke groeipunte" in *ORANJE*, March 1982, p. 1—3; H.F. Verwoerd "Oranjewerkers ywer vir blanke groeipunte en selfwerksaamheid", *Die Patriot* (Pretoria), 25 June 1982, p. 9.
- ¹⁴ Jürgen Blenck and Klaus Baron von der Ropp "Republik Südafrika: Teilung als Ausweg?", *Außenpolitik* (Hamburg), 3/1976, p. 308—324; by the same authors "Republic of South Africa: Is Partition a Solution", *South African Journal of African Affairs*, 1/1977, p. 21—32.
- ¹⁵ Cf. for instance Colin Legum (ed), *Africa Contemporary Record 1977—78* (Africana, London, 1978), p. B 885 — B 886; Gavin Maasdorp "Forms of Partition", in Robert I. Rotberg and John Barratt (eds) "The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination", Berkeley, 1980. On the international reactions to these papers see Klaus Baron von der Ropp "Is Territorial Partition a Strategy for Peaceful Change in South Africa", *Int. Affairs Bulletin* June 1979, p. 36—47; by the same author "Power Sharing versus Partition in South Africa", *Australian Outlook* (Canberra) 2/1981, p. 158—168; by the same author "L'avenir de l'Afrique du Sud" in *Politique Etrangère* (Paris) 2/1982, p. 429—440.
- ¹⁶ Van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
- ¹⁷ P.L. Moorcraft "Towards the Garrison State" in F.M. Clifford Vaughan (ed), *International Pressures and Political Change in SA*, Oxford U.P., Cape Town, 1978, p. 86—105; Pierre Mayer "Scénarios Sud-africains", *Politique Internationale* (Paris), 1/1978, p. 143—152; Heribert Adam "Three Perspectives on the Future of SA", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Leyden), 1—2 1979, p. 122—136; Arend Lijphart "Federal, Confederal and Consociational Options for the SA Plural Society", in Robert I. Rotberg and John Barratt, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁸ Newell M. Stultz, *op. cit.*
 A.J. Venter "Some of South Africa's Political Alternatives in Consociational Perspective", *South Africa International*, 3/1981, p. 129—141 (141).
 Newell M. Stultz "On Partition" in *Social Dynamics* (Kaapstad) 1/1979, p. 1—13; by the same author "Transkei Independence in Separatist Perspective" in *South Africa International* 1/1977, p. 10—26.